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A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain per-
ception and body awareness. Here we report a novel neuropsychological condition in which
right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body owner-
ship. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were present,
these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them.We reasoned that this was an ideal
condition to examine whether pain perception can be “referred” to an alien arm subjec-
tively experienced as one’s own. Seventeen patients (11 with, 6 without the delusion), and
10 healthy controls were administered a nociceptive stimulation protocol to assess pain per-
ception. In the OWN condition, participants placed their arms on a table in front of them. In
the ALIEN condition, the co-experimenter’s left (or right) arm was placed alongside the par-
ticipants’ left (or right) arm, respectively. In the OWN condition, left (or right) participants’
hand dorsum were stimulated. In the ALIEN condition, left (or right) co-experimenter’s
hand dorsum was stimulated. Participants had to rate the perceived pain on a 0–5 Likert
scale (0=no pain, 5=maximal imaginable pain). Results showed that healthy controls and
patients without delusion gave scores higher than zero only when their own hands were
stimulated. On the contrary, patients with delusion gave scores higher than zero both when
their own hands (left or right) were stimulated and when the co-experimenter’s left hand
was stimulated. Our results show that in pathological conditions, a body part of another
person can become so deeply embedded in one’s own somatosensory representation to
effect the subjective feeling of pain. More in general, our findings are in line with a growing
number of evidence emphasizing the role of the special and unique perceptual status of
body ownership in giving rise to the phenomenological experience of pain.
Keywords: body ownership, disownership, pain, brain-damaged patients, body awareness
INTRODUCTION
Pain perception is at the root of animal life and is vital to survival.
Being able to perceive pain protects us by triggering a reflexive
withdrawal from potentially dangerous stimuli before we can suf-
fer further injury, it tells us that an injury is about to occur, it lets
us know when we need to seek medical help, and teaches us what
behaviors to avoid in the future.
Given such a higher evolutionary significance of pain percep-
tion, one would be keen to consider it an all-or-none phenomenon
or, at least, tightly regulated by the input features (e.g., stimulus
modality, intensity, duration, etc.). However, the current evidence
on pain perception tells us a different story. The neural encoding
of internal or external events that injures, or threatens to injure,
our body is known as nociception. Nociceptors (i.e., pain recep-
tors) detect when thermal, chemical, and mechanical stimuli are
above a threshold. Then, the information is sent through the spinal
cord and the brainstem up to the cortex. Nociception automati-
cally triggers a variety of autonomic responses (e.g., hypertension,
tachycardia, and fainting). Nonetheless, it can also generate an
emotional and unpleasant subjective experience related to the
stimulation known as pain perception.
It is known that the relationship between noxious stimuli
(input) and its pain perception (output) is usually non-linear.
Along the route from nociception to pain, several psychological,
and/or cognitive factors modulate the physiology of pain before it
becomes part of our consciousness. It is known, for instance, that
pain perception can be ameliorated by the context as demonstrated
by the fact that soldiers suffering from compound fractures dur-
ing battles can report only twinges of pain (Horstman and Flax,
1999). The same has been reported with respect to the focus of
attention: noxious stimuli are perceived less intense when people
are distracted by other potentially relevant stimuli (Terkelsen et al.,
2004). In addition, expectations have a crucial role, as shown by
the fact that healing expectations can enhance the placebo effect
(Turner et al., 1994). In some cases, a person can even experience
pain without nociception. Amputees, for instance, can experience
phantom pain that is painful perception referred to the absent
limb (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998).
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Due to its complexity, pain perception does not rely on the
activity of a single brain structure but, rather, on a large distrib-
uted cortical/subcortical network known as pain matrix (see, for
instance, Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010). According to the projec-
tions sites from either the medial or the lateral thalamic structures
to the cortex, this system can be broadly subdivided in two sub-
components a “medial pain system” that processes the emotional
aspects (e.g., unpleasantness) and a “lateral pain system” that sub-
serves intensity, location, and duration (Albe-Fessard et al., 1985).
The first system includes amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, hip-
pocampus, hypothalamus, locus coeruleus, and periaqueductal
gray matter, whereas the second involves primary and secondary
somatosensory cortex, parietal operculum, and insula. However,
the crucial problem is that the extent to which this activity repre-
sents, or even correlates, with pain perception is unclear since those
brain responses can be generated in non-nociceptive conditions
(e.g., Craig et al., 1996).
Another interesting point related to pain perception is its con-
nection with body ownership, which is the conscious experience
that bodily states are so clearly and inexorably “mine” (Gallagher,
2000). Experiencing the body as one’s own is a prerequisite for
almost every cognitive function, it is intimately related to human’s
self-consciousness, and it shapes individual psychological iden-
tity. Indeed, our body constantly receives flows of inputs (i.e.,
touch, vision, proprioception, and interception). Notwithstand-
ing, in order to be considered as potentially noxious (i.e., relevant)
stimuli, these inputs must be invariably perceived as parts of one’s
own body and as unique to oneself. Put in another way, human’s
experience of pain is strictly dependent from the way we repre-
sent the body itself and from the sense that it is my body that is
undergoing a certain experience (i.e., body ownership).
A first hint with respect to the relationship between body own-
ership and pain is the feeling of “foreignness” toward the affected
body part often observed in patients affected by regional pain syn-
drome (Bultitude and Rafal, 2010). Perhaps, the more compelling
evidence of the tight link between body ownership and pain has
been obtained in healthy participants by means of an experimental
manipulation in which the physical constraints subserving body
ownership are altered. Such a paradigm, known as the “rubber
hand illusion” (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), shows that synchro-
nous touches onto a visible rubber hand and onto the hidden
participants’ hand produce the compelling feeling of ownership
of that hand (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Farnè et al., 2000;
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and
Haggard, 2007; Longo et al., 2008). This is demonstrated both sub-
jectively (i.e., by a self-report questionnaire) and behaviorally (i.e.,
the location of one’s own hand is shifted toward the rubber hand).
Crucially, recent studies (Capelari et al., 2009; Mohan et al.,
2012) showed that the rubber hand illusion arises also with
synchronous tactile noxious stimuli (but, see also Valenzuela-
Moguillansky et al., 2011) and the effects do not differ from those
obtained with non-noxious tactile stimuli (Capelari et al., 2009).
These experiments suggest that pain can be referred to the rubber
hand as long as it is being perceived as part of one’s own body
(Capelari et al., 2009; Mohan et al., 2012). More in general, they
indicate that the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in localizing
touch during the illusion might be, at least in part, similar to those
required to localize pain. This is an important point since it is
often assumed that touch can be referred to external objects (e.g.,
tips of tools; Iriki et al., 1996), whereas pain cannot.
The effect observed during the rubber hand illusion implies
that whenever we feel an external body part as part of our’s own
body, noxious, exactly as non-noxious, stimuli can be potentially
referred to it. During the illusion, painful perception is reported
to arise from the rubber hand while one’s own hand is actually
receiving the stimulation. In the present paper, we asked a further
question that is whether an altered feeling of body ownership can
affect painful perception to a degree that it is possible to experi-
ence the pain delivered to an alien hand without any simultaneous
stimulation on one’s own hand.
We aimed at answer this question within a neuropsycholog-
ical approach. Indeed, patients’ counterintuitive behavior can
potentially unmask the inadequacies of theories on human brain
functioning hidden from the view in the intact brain (see Church-
land, 1986 for a discussion on this point). In the present context,
studying the abnormalities of the integration among the different
components of body ownership due to brain damages has a key
role in addressing questions regarding the structure and functional
signature of body consciousness. Here, we focused on a subgroup
of right brain-damaged patients affected by a selective disturbance
of body ownership, which is they misattribute another person’s
arm to themselves (Garbarini et al., 2013). Specifically, when both
their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were visible, they
tended to claim that the latter belonged to them. Moreover, these
patients treated and cared the co-experimenter’s left arm as their
own’s one even if provided with contrary evidence coming from
different sensory modalities. Hence, we compared patients with
such a delusion with participants who did not have this expe-
rience (i.e., right brain-damaged patients without the delusion
and healthy subjects). The task required participants to rate the
perceived pain evoked by nociceptive stimulators administered
under different conditions (i.e., stimulation of both the partici-
pant and the co-experimenter’s hands). If conscious experience
of owning an alien arm is the result of a profound embodiment
of the alien arm into the participant’s sensory-motor circuits, it
should produce a pain perception when stimuli are applied onto
the co-experimenter’s left hand only in patients affected by the
delusion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
BASELINE ASSESSMENT
Seventeen consecutive right-handed patients (five women;
mean age 65.93 years, SD= 12.89 years; mean educational level
9.43 years, SD= 5.31 years) with right hemisphere lesion and 10
age and educational level-matched right-handed healthy subjects
participated in the study after having given written informed
consent according to the declaration of Helsinki. Patients’ demo-
graphic, clinical, and neuropsychological data are reported in
Table 1. Patients were admitted to a rehabilitation center for the
treatment of their neurocognitive deficits and none of them had
a history of substance abuse or previous neurological diseases.
All suffered from a single right hemisphere lesion confirmed by
CT or MRI scans. Lesions involved several cortical/subcortical
structures, as well as white matter, within fronto-temporo-parietal
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Table 1 | Demographic and clinical data of patients.
Id G S A S E D NE A MMSE Neglect Som Aso Mis
V M S M S EP P Arm Arms
BIT-C BIT-B Fluff Pt Co-ex Pt Co-ex
1 E+ F 72 5 I 60 0–0 3–3 3–3 0–0 2–2 28 66 60 0 N N 100 100 0 100
2 E+ F 50 18 I 40 0–0 3–3 3–3 0–0 2–2 29 139 79 0 N N 100 100 50 50
3 E+ M 78 8 I 60 0–0 0–0 3–3 0–0 2–2 29 50 42 0 N N 100 100 0 100
4 E+ M 82 8 I 45 0–0 3–3 2–2 0–0 2–2 27 89 46 0 N N 100 100 0 100
5 E+ F 75 5 I 40 0–0 3–3 2–2 2–2 2–2 28 90 59 0 N N 100 100 0 100
6 E+ M 68 5 I 70 1–1 3–3 3–3 0–0 2–2 25 14 1 3 N N 100 100 0 100
7 E+ M 64 17 I 50 1–1 3–3 3–3 0–0 2–2 25 135 40 2 N N 100 100 0 100
8 E+ F 77 17 H 35 0–0 3–3 3–3 0–0 0–0 28 140 73 0 N N 100 100 0 100
9 E+ M 55 5 I 30 0–0 3–3 2–2 0–0 0–0 18 17 8 3 Y N 100 100 0 100
10 E+ M 69 8 I 30 0–0 3–3 0–0 0–0 0–0 27 138 75 0 N N 100 100 0 100
11 E+ M 64 17 I 50 1–1 3–3 0–0 0–0 0–0 25 140 70 0 N N 100 100 0 100
12 E− M 64 5 I 40 0–0 3–3 2–2 0–0 2–2 26 141 76 0 N N 100 0 100 0
13 E− M 65 8 I 50 0–0 3–3 3–3 0–0 2–2 28 100 56 0 N N 100 0 100 0
14 E− F 37 18 I 50 0–0 3–3 3–3 0–0 0–0 30 91 53 0 N N 100 0 100 0
15 E− M 68 8 I 30 0–0 3–3 0–0 0–0 0–0 30 131 79 1 N N 100 0 100 0
16 E− M 83 3 I 30 0–0 3–3 0–0 0–0 0–0 25 145 81 0 N N 100 0 100 0
17 E− M 48 13 I 101 0–0 3–3 0–0 0–0 0–0 30 144 82 0 N N 100 0 100 0
Id, patient’s code; G, group: presence (E+) or absence (E−) of embodiment of the co-experimenter’s arm (see misattribution column); S, sex; M, male; F, female;
A, age; S, schooling: years of formal education; E, etiology; H, hemorrhage; I, ischemia; D, duration of the disease: number of days (d) between the onset of the
disease and the first assessment; NE, neurological examination: contralesional motor (M), somatosensory (noxious and non-noxious stimuli; S), and visual half-field
(V) neurological deficits (the two values refer to the upper and lower limb/visual quadrants, respectively); scores ranged from normal (0) to severe defects (3). A,
anosognosia: unawareness of the motor (M), somatosensory (S), neurological deficits (the two values refer to the upper and lower limbs respectively); for the motor
deficits, scores ranged from normal (0) to severe defects (3), whereas for the somatosensory deficits, scores ranged from normal (0) to severe defects (2). MMSE,
mini mental state examination: cut off 24. Neglect: EP, extrapersonal; BIT-C, Behavioral InattentionTest – Conventional subtest, cut off 129; BIT-B, Behavioral Inattention
Test – Behavioral subtest, cut off 67); P, personal; FLUFF test, cut off 2). Som, somatoparaphrenia: Y, yes; No, no; Aso, verbal asomatognosia: Y, yes; N, no; Mis,
misattribution: one (arm) or two (arms) are present; Pt, patient; Co-ex, co-experimenter; numbers represent the % of times in which patient reaches that arm (eight
trials).
regions. Patients were initially screened with the mini mental
state examination (Measso et al., 1993) to exclude the presence
of severe cognitive impairments. Contralesional somatosensory,
motor, visual field defects as well as unawareness for motor and
somatosensory deficits were assessed according to the a standard
neurological exam (see Pia et al., 2013 for details). It is worth notic-
ing that somatosensory defects were assessed with both tactile and
noxious (pinprick stimulators) stimuli. No dissociation was found
between presence/absence of the defects, as well as unawareness
of them. In other words, administering non-noxious or noxious
stimuli did not make any difference. The presence of left extrap-
ersonal neglect was assessed with the behavioral and conventional
scales of the Behavioral Inattention Test (Wilson et al., 1987), and
left personal neglect with the Fluff test (Cocchini et al., 2001).
Patients were also evaluated for somatoparaphrenia (Fotopoulou
et al., 2011) and verbal asomatognosia (Feinberg et al., 1990).
The misattribution of the co-experimenter arm was assessed
in the following way: patients were requested to lie their arms
on a table. A same-gender co-experimenter’s left (Figure 1C) or
right (Figure 1B) arm was positioned on the same table, aligned
with the patients’ trunk midline and internal with respect to the
patients’ left (Figure 1C) or right (Figure 1B) arm. In one condi-
tion (Figure 1B), patients were asked to reach (eight trials) with
their right, intact hand their own left hand and to name the color
(eight trials) of the object positioned in front of their own left hand
(in fact, three objects of different colors were placed in front of the
own left and right hand, and the co-experimenter’s left hand).
In another condition (Figure 1C), patients were asked to name
the color (eight trials) of the object positioned in front of their
own right hand. Respect to the right, all patients indicated (100%)
the color of the object in front of their own hand. As regards the
left, 11 patients consistently reached (90%) the co-experimenter’s
hand (and named the color of the objects in front of the co-
experimenter’s hand; hereinafter E+ group), whereas six reached
(100%) their own hand (and named the color of the objects in
front of their own hand; hereinafter E− group). It is worth notic-
ing that patients correctly reached and (or) named their own hands
when only their own arms were lying on the table (Figure 1A).
EXPERIMENTAL TASK
Each participant sat in front of a table desk and a same-gender
co-experimenter sat behind her/him. In the OWN condition,
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FIGURE 1 |The four experimental conditions. Own (A) and Alien (B,C).
Participant’s hands (white), co-experimenter’s hand (light gray).
participants simply laid down their arms on the table (Figure 1A).
In ALIEN conditions, the co-experimenter placed his/her left
(or right) arm, on the table (by passing under the patient’s
armpit), aligned with the participant trunk midline and posi-
tioned internally with respect to the participant’s left (or right)
arm, respectively (Figures 1B,C). Hence, in the ALIEN condi-
tion, the co-experimenter’s hand was placed exactly where it was
the participant’s hand in the OWN condition. A white sheet was
draped over patient’s trunk, and arranged in order to prevent the
direct vision of any body parts except hands. Noxious stimuli
were administered by means of a homemade nociceptive stimula-
tor with a cylindrical body in aluminum (length 20 cm, diameter
0.7 cm) and a retractable sharp tip in stainless steel able to apply
fixed stimulus intensities (the exerted forces was about 500 mN).
In the OWN condition, five stimuli for each participant’s hand
dorsum were administered while in the ALIEN condition, the five
stimuli were administered to each co-experimenter’s hand dor-
sum. The sequence was repeated twice (ABCD–DCBA order) and
counterbalanced across participants. The total number of stimuli
was forty. After each stimulation, participants were asked to rate
the pain feelings evoked by the pinprick stimulators on a verbal
rating scale (with 0 indicating“no pain,”and 5 indicating“maximal
imaginable pain”). In order to control the effects of sensitization
or fatigue, successive stimuli were applied in different spot of skin
(some millimeters away). The mean ratings were employed to
perform statistical analysis between and within groups.
RESULTS
A repeated measures ANOVA on the mean score with OWNER
(two levels: participant, co-experimenter) and HAND (left, right)
as within-subjects factor, and GROUP (three levels: E+, E−, C) as
between-subjects factor was performed (see Figure 2).
The main factor OWNER resulted to be significant
[F(1,24)= 236.34, p< 0.00001)], namely participants gave a
higher score when the stimulation was given on their own hands
(mean= 3.579, SE= 0.201) respect to when it was administered to
the co-experimenter’s hands (mean= 0.47, SE= 0.103). Also the
OWNER×GROUP interaction was significant [F(2,24)= 15.26,
p< 0.0001)], with the score given by the E+ group when the co-
experimenter’s hands were stimulated (mean= 1.409, SE= 0.156)
significantly (Duncan post hoc test p< 0.0001) higher respect to
both E− (mean= 0, SE= 0) and C (mean= 0, SE= 0) groups.
Crucially, the OWNER×GROUP×HAND interaction was sig-
nificant.
As regards the right hand, each group gave a significant (Dun-
can post hoc test p< 0.00001) higher score when the stimulation
was given on the own right hand (E+: mean= 3.64, SE= 0.306;
E−: 4.416, SE= 0.414; C: 4.15, SE= 0.321) with respect to the
co-experimenter’s right hand (E+: mean= 0.182, SE= 0.117; E−:
0, SE= 0; C: 0, SE= 0). Indeed, no significant between-groups
differences were found either for the own right hand or for the
co-experimenter’s right hand (Duncan post hoc test p> 0.05).
As regards the left hand, both E− and C groups gave
a significant (Duncan post hoc test p< 0.0005) higher score
when the stimulation was given on their own left hand (E−:
mean= 2.583, SE= 0.623; C: mean= 4.05, SE= 0.483) than
on the co-experimenter’s left hand (E−: mean= 0, SE= 0; C:
mean= 0, SE= 0). One the contrary, the E+ group gave simi-
lar rating (Duncan post hoc test p> 0.05) when the stimulation
was on the own left hand or on the co-experimenter’s left hand
(own: mean= 2.636, SE= 0.46; alien: 2.636= 0.305). Therefore
for the left hand, significant between-groups differences were
found (Duncan post hoc test p< 0.05). It is worth noting that in
both E+ and E− groups the scores given to the own left hand was
somehow lower than those given by the C group when their own
left hand was stimulated (see above). This difference was mainly
due to the presence in both groups of four patients who, being
hemianesthesia, but not anosognosic, gave very low score to the
capacity of the contralesional hand to perceive pain. Interestingly,
the two E+ patients also gave low score to the co-experimenter’s,
embodied, left hand.
DISCUSSION
With the present investigation, we aimed at examining the rela-
tionship between humans’ body ownership and the subjective
experience of pain. We tested right brain-damaged patients who
were convinced that the examiner’s left hand belonged to them.
We asked whether (or not) such a (pathological) feeling of owning
someone else’s hand can trigger pain perception each time the alien
hand is stimulated with noxious stimuli. We predicted that if the
alien hand is so deeply embodied in patients’ body representation,
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FIGURE 2 | Mean rating of the three groups (10 E+, 6 E–, and 10 C) in
the four experimental conditions. Rating of each subgroups obtained
taking into account sensory deficits, and awareness of them (i.e., AHA−,
hemianesthesia without anosognosia; HA−, no loss; AHA+, anosognosia
for hemianesthesia) are also plotted. *Significant (p<0.05); n.s., not
significant (p>0.05).
noxious stimuli might be referred to the patients’ body in absence
of any concurrent stimulation of the own hand.
As expected, all participants correctly judged the delivering of
noxious stimuli (i.e., gave scores significantly higher than zero)
when their own right, but not the co-experimenter’s right was
stimulated (the score did not differ between groups). Similarly,
healthy subjects and patients without delusion of ownership gave
scores higher than zero only when the stimulation was adminis-
tered to their own left hand. Most importantly, and according to
our prediction, patients who misattributed the alien hand to their
body gave scores higher than zero, not only when their own left
hand was stimulated, but also when noxious stimuli were deliv-
ered to the co-experimenter’s left hand. This result suggest that
as long as an arm is subjectively perceived as part of one’s own
body, painful stimuli delivered to an alien hand are experienced
as if given to the own hand. In order to understand this puzzling
phenomenon, it is crucial to examine the possible mechanisms
underlying the pathological embodiment of the alien hand. The
embodiment per se cannot be ascribed to the presence of personal
neglect (i.e., inattention to the left side of the body): beyond the
fact that the neuropsychological baseline assessment revealed its
presence in only three patients (#6, 7#, and #9), the assessment
of misattribution of the co-experimenter’s arm showed that E+
patients were perfectly able to reach their own left arm with their
right (when the co-experimenter’s left was not present). There-
fore the presence of personal neglect does not seem necessary to
cause the delusion. Much more interesting is the fact that the
delusion emerged only under some specific constraints. Firstly, it
appeared when the co-experimenter’s left arm was placed parallel
and internal, but not external, to the patient’s left arm. It is worth
noticing that when the delusion emerged, E+ patients “saw” both
arms, their own and the co-experimenter’s left, and often attrib-
uted their own to the co-experimenter (interestingly, these patients
never displayed such a delusional beliefs about their own contrale-
sional body part (Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Gandola et al., 2012),
when only their own arms were lying on the table). Secondly, the
delusion disappeared when the co-experimenter’s left arm was
180° -oriented (independently from its horizontal position with
respect to the patient’s left arm). Finally, it disappeared also when
the co-experimenter’s left arm was replaced with a rubber glove
(independently from its position or horizontal orientation with
respect to the patient’s left arm). We must emphasize that since
we aimed at exclude a pure perceptual effect, the rubber glove was
not realistic as in previous studies (Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Zeller
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et al., 2011) and participants clearly recognized it was non-human
(see also below).
The interpretations of the rubber hand illusion effects on
healthy participants may shed light on the above-mentioned
constraints for the emergence of the delusion. There is a wide
agreement in considering a bottom-up multisensory integration
between vision and touch as a necessary condition for experiencing
the illusion. However, for some authors (Armel and Ramachan-
dran, 2003) this process is sufficient to generate the illusion. This,
in turn, would predict the emergence of the illusion under a wide
range of visual conditions as, for instance, when the rubber hand
is in incongruent position with respect to the patient’s body or
even when it is replaced by a non-human object. On the contrary,
other authors (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) suggested that mul-
tisensory integration is not sufficient for the illusion to emerge
because the on-line sensation must be necessarily compared to
pre-existing body representations. This, in turn, would predict that
the emergence of the illusion is constrained by these pre-existing
representations of the body as the congruence in terms of position
and identity.
In the present study, the conditions for the emergence of the
pathological delusion of ownership are in line with the latter
above-mentioned hypothesis (constraints imposed by the internal
body representations). It is interesting to note that, despite in E+
patients the brain-damage has altered the normal body ownership
(i.e., pathological embodiment), spared pre-existing representa-
tions of the body imposed limits on the type representation and
its configuration. Hence, the congruence of the alien hand in terms
of position and identity is necessary in order to accept an external
object as belonging to one’s own body.
However, the fact that vision of someone else’s hand was suffi-
cient to immediately produce the delusion differs from the rubber
hand illusion in which repeated simultaneous stimulation of the
fake and real hand is necessary for the illusion to emerge. It is
interesting to note that a delusion of ownership due to the interac-
tion between internal representations of the body with bottom-up
unimodal (visual) stimuli has been reported also in healthy sub-
jects (Slater et al., 2010). The authors showed that a first person
perspective of a life-sized virtual human body that appears to sub-
stitute the participant’s own body was sufficient to generate a body
transfer illusion. In other words, the authors demonstrated a delu-
sion of ownership (i.e., a full body illusion) entirely due to visual
capture mechanisms (i.e., without simultaneous synchronous tac-
tile stimulations). Interestingly, first person perspective and level
of skin realism were necessary in order the experience the illusion.
This is in line with the fact that here the delusion disappeared
when the co-experimenter’s left arm was 180° -oriented or with
the rubber glove.
The second point we should discuss is why E+patients reported
pain feelings when noxious stimuli were delivered to the embod-
ied arm. Some interesting hints come from examining the pres-
ence or absence of noxious/non-noxious deficits and awareness of
noxious/non-noxious deficits in our sample of patients. Although
unawareness of sensory deficits (AHA+ in Figure 2) seems to
be more frequent in E+ (7 out of 11) than in E− (2 out of 6)
patients, AHA+ seems to be not sufficient to explain the misat-
tribution of painful perception. Indeed, the two AHA+ patients
of the E− group did not experience pain when the left alien hand
was stimulated. This seems to suggest that the subjective feeling
of pain might be somehow related to an a priori embodiment of
the alien hand. More importantly, E+ patients who acknowledged
the sensory deficit on their own hand (AHA− in Figure 2) did not
experience noxious stimuli on the left alien hand, coherently with
their normal sensory awareness. This means that the alien embod-
ied hand is subject to the similar sensory properties as one’s own
hand. This is in line with the fact that when patients normally feel
sensation on their left hand (HA− in Figure 2) or report to feel
sensation on their left anesthetic hand due to the unawareness for
the deficit (AHA+), the subjective feeling of pain delivered to the
left alien hand is observed only in E+ patients.
Nonetheless, the crucial aspect related to the subjective feeling
of pain when the co-experimenter’s hand is stimulated is the fact
that stimuli must be seen. This is not trivial but, rather, consistent
with the everyday experience that visual awareness of body parts
can highly affects incoming tactile information. For instance, when
an insect crawls on our skin, we do not experience any sensation if
the stimulation is beyond the mechanical threshold. However, if we
shift our sight toward the insect a vivid tactile experience can arise
due to the interaction between localization and tactile noise. Other
less anecdotic findings supports this idea. For example, right brain
damages patients with partial sensory loss can report improved
tactile sensation when they see the affected hand being touched
(Halligan et al., 1997; Rorden et al., 1999). Moreover, in phantom
limb patients, phantom pain can be ameliorated by superimposing
the unaffected limb on the amputated one in a mirror (Ramachan-
dran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996; MacLachlan et al., 2003)
or by controlling a limb in virtual reality (Murray et al., 2007; Cole
et al., 2009; Sato et al., 2010). Similarly, during the rubber hand
illusion, potentially harmful or noxious stimuli approaching the
rubber hand elicits the same brain activity (Ehrsson et al., 2007)
and skin conductance response (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003)
as when the healthy participant’s real hand is stimulated.
Tactile awareness, however, can be consciously reported even
in situation in which the physical counterpart is absent (i.e., visual
capture of touch). For instance, simply stroking a fake hand with
a laser light can produce illusory thermal or tactile sensations in
one’s own arm (Durgin et al., 2007). Similarly, in synesthetic indi-
viduals (i.e., people who experience a sensation in one modality
when the stimulation is delivered in another sensory modality),
the observation of another person being touched can be experi-
enced as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of one’s own
body (Blakemore et al., 2005). Visual capture of touch has been
interpreted in terms of a strong preference of the human’s brain
to operate, in normal circumstances, under the principle of multi-
sensory integration. This means that if input has a high certainty
in one sensory modality, it can induce perceptual consequences in
a different modality (Driver and Spence, 2000).
On this basis, it is possible to suggest that when E+ patients
“saw” noxious stimuli delivered to a body parts that they subjec-
tively perceive as own, they report painful feelings (as if stimuli
were delivered to their own body). Note that the misattribution
is not aspecific so to make them to experience all sort of stim-
uli delivered to whatsoever body part in the environment. On
the contrary, it is circumscribed to the embodied alien arm and,
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as such, strictly related to the altered body representation. It is
interesting to note that in our patients such a visual capture of
touch might be independent from the ability to potentially per-
ceive stimuli. Indeed, the two E+ patients with no sensory loss
(HA−), attributed pain perception to the co-experimenter’s left
hand despite they were able to feel tactile sensation on his/her left
hand. In other words, being or not being able to feel does not
affect the subjective feeling when the embodiment mechanism
has induced the pathological body part attribution. Interestingly,
the effect differed from the one reported during the rubber hand
illusion (Capelari et al., 2009; Mohan et al., 2012) since here
an altered feeling of body ownership can affect somatic sensa-
tion to a degree that it is possible to experience pain delivered
to an alien hand in absence of any simultaneous stimulation
of the own hand (in the rubber hand illusion the sensation is
referred to the rubber hand while the own hand is receiving the
stimulation). So far, only one study has reported similar find-
ings (Aimola Davies and White, 2013). The authors administered
a no-touch version of the rubber hand illusion (stimulation of
the viewed prosthetic hand but no-touch of the participant’s
hidden hand) to individuals with vision-touch synesthesia and
healthy controls. Only synesthetics experienced the rubber hand
illusion: the tactile sensation on their hand was referred to the
prosthetic hand and their own hand resulted shifted toward the
prosthetic hand.
The third point we should address is the possible neural basis
of the delusion and of the illusory painful perception. It is crucial
to emphasize that at the time of testing not all the MRI or CT
scans were available and, hence, we were not able to map and ana-
lyze in depth the lesional pattern in the whole sample of patients.
Nonetheless, an inspection of the existing scans suggested that
putamen, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, external capsule, parietal
periventricular white matter and part of the insula might be more
critically associated to the damages of the E+, rather than E−,
group. Among the above-mentioned structures, some authors sug-
gested that insular cortex might subserve pain processing (Coghill
et al., 1994, 1999) and the subjective experience of one’s body
(Karnath et al., 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007). Nonetheless, damages
to putamen and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex have been suggested
to be crucial for the emergence of in such a delusion of ownership
(Garbarini et al., 2013). Hence, these conclusions should be con-
sidered highly speculative and exhaustive anatomical analyses are
needed.
The present data are in line with a study recently published
by our group (Garbarini et al., 2013). In that paper, we demon-
strated that the pathological embodiment of an alien hand can
have objective consequences on the motor behavior of the intact
hand. Indeed, in a bimanual task where subjects had to draw lines
with the right hand and circles with the left, we found an oval-
ization of the lines when E+ patients observed an alien left hand
drawing circles (the effect was similar to the one observed when
healthy participants actually perform the task). It is interesting to
note that, consistently with the above-mentioned constraints for
the emergence of the delusion of ownership in E+ patients, cou-
pling disappeared when the alien hand was arm was 180° -oriented.
This effects indicate that the altered body ownership affects both
motor awareness (despite usually aware of not being able to move,
E+ patients, were convinced that their left hand was moving) and
sense of agency (E+ patients ascribed the alien movements to
themselves) by directly modulating action execution. These data
suggested that the embodiment of someone else’s arm body can
affect also internal motor programs.
Summarizing, we showed that the pathological delusion of
owning an alien arm triggers pain perception when the alien hand
is stimulated. We suggest that brain damages might have led these
patients to assign ownership and visual (noxious) stimuli to an
alien hand. Pre-existing (spared) models of the body distinguished
between objects that may (or may not) be part of one’s own body
on the basis of constraints (e.g., first person perspective, position
with respect to the patient’s trunk midline, skin realism). In these
conditions, if a noxious stimulus touches what is felt as looks like
their own arm, this will be painful.
We must acknowledge a limit of the present investigation: we
do not have any direct electrophysiological or neuroimaging data
showing the activation of patients’ sensory processes. Hence, fur-
ther studies are needed to answer this question. However, the
phenomenon observed in E+ patients seems more likely to be
explained in term of “perceiving” the stimulus rather than simply
“reporting” what the patient see. Indeed, E+ patients aware that
they could not feel any tactile stimulation on their own left hand
(hemianesthesia without anosognosia), rated 0 noxious stimuli
when both their own left and the co-experimenter’s (embodied)
left hand was stimulated, whereas rated significantly higher than 0
noxious stimuli delivered to their own right hand. This means, at
least, that the phenomenon is linked to sensory functions.
To conclude, further studies are needed to clarify the anatomo-
physiological mechanisms responsible for both pathological attri-
bution of other’s body part and the subjective experience of pain.
Nonetheless, what clearly emerges from our data is that pain
perception is not an all-or-none phenomenon, simply related
to the direct bottom-up stimulation of nociceptors, but is inti-
mately connected to the experience of body ownership that, in
a top-down manner, may modulate self-consciousness and even
personal identity (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Edelman, 2004).
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